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 The displacement effect of convenience: the case of recycling 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
In light of increasingly ambitious recycling targets it is important to analyse the potential 
displacement effect of improving access to kerbside provision on other forms of recycling. Do 
households view the different modes of recycling as substitutes or complements of each other? Does 
this perceived relationship depend on the type of material recycled? Using data for all of the UK’s 
local governments from 2004Q2 to 2013Q3 we analyse the nature of the relationship between the two 
main channels of recycling. In the case of dry recycling, the empirical findings are ambiguous on the 
trade-off between kerbside and non-kerbside recycling. On the one hand, the findings suggest that 
there is no trade-off when considering the effect of expanding kerbside provision. On the other hand, 
the findings also suggest that there is a trade-off when we focus on the effect of expanding 
non-kerbside provision. However, putting together the empirical findings with theory (in particular, 
the symmetry property of the Hicksian substitution effect) suggests that there is a trade-off 
irrespective of whether we consider expansion of kerbside or non-kerbside provision. In the case of 
green (compost) recycling the empirical findings on their own or together with theory unambiguously 
suggest that there is a trade-off.  
 
Key words: recycling; substitutability; gross substitutability; waste policy. 
 
JEL classification: O18; Q58; R11; R15 
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1. Introduction 
From a household perspective the single biggest factor contributing to the convenience of recycling 
has been the improved provision of recycling services at the kerbside. However, local drop-off 
recycling centres still remain an important component of the recycling infrastructure. Therefore, an 
interesting question to ask is to what extent households view these different channels of recycling 
service provision as substitutable or complementary. The total proportion of waste recycled and the 
split between the various channels can change, depending on the recyclability of materials and 
households’ propensity to undertake recycling. Propensity to recycle via a particular channel may be 
affected positively or negatively by recycling behaviour through other channels. Such positive and 
negative effects can be due to enhanced awareness or due to subtractability and moral licencing 
(Merritt et al., 2010). Subtractability relates to the physical constraint that a single container cannot be 
recycled simultaneously through different channels. Moral licensing occurs across different domains 
of behaviour. For example, in relation to recycling and public transport, individuals may hold the 
view that because they recycle they are entitled not to use public transport. Likewise, within a single 
domain like recycling, individuals may feel they do enough recycling at the kerb so that any further 
waste separation is not required. 
A key factor in explaining recycling behaviour appears to be the provision of kerbside 
collection schemes (e.g. Callan and Thomas, 1997; Dahlén, 2007; Jenkins et al., 2003; Kinnaman and 
Fullerton, 2000; Larsen, 2010; Sidique et al., 2010a). Also important are the specific attributes of the 
scheme, such as convenience (Ando and Gosselin, 2005) and the size of the recycling container or the 
frequency of recycling and residual waste collections (Abbott et al., 2011; WRAP, 2009; 2010b; 
WYG Environment, 2012). Other contributions have sought to examine the nature of spillovers 
between various policies to enhance recycling or reduce waste. Jenkins et al. (2003) find a positive 
marginal effect for recycling at both the kerbside and local drop-off centres for a range of materials, 
with the incremental effect being smaller for materials where alternative recycling options are already 
in place. Using data from California’s Department of Conservation, Beatty et al. (2007) consider the 
marginal effect of expanding kerbside provision on quantities recycled by households at the kerb, at 
recycling centres and on overall recycling quantity. The overall benefits of kerbside recycling are 
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found to be small, since improved recycling volumes from providing kerbside collections are offset by 
lower returns at recycling centres. Sidique et al. (2010) find contradictory evidence of a trade-off, 
where in one case they hypothesise a complementary relationship between kerbside and non-kerbside 
recycling (Sidique et al., 2010a), whereas in another, they find no evidence of any relationship 
between them (Sidique et al., 2010b).  
 In this paper, we develop a theoretical model to understand better the interactions between 
different recycling behaviours. We complement the approach taken by D’Amato et al. (2016), who 
examine the relationship between waste reduction and recycling behaviours.1 We provide a bridge 
between the notion of a substitution/complement relationship and empirically available data on 
volumes of recycling. Although the context is recycling, our analysis has a broader policy reach. 
Whatever the policy domain, to accurately assess the contribution of interventions, they should be 
assessed for their potential to compete with existing measures. If the degree of substitutability 
between various interventions is found to be high, policymakers would do well to reappraise their 
policy mix. Our analysis complements the strand of literature that explains the motivation for 
recycling (e.g. Abbott et al., 2013; Berglund, 2006; Cerere et al., 2014), as well as contributing to 
research that explains behavioural spillovers (e.g. Bratt, 1999; Dolan and Galizzi, 2015; Truelove et 
al., 2014).  
 Using three-stage least squares (3SLS) estimation (Zellner and Theil, 1962) of a system of 
equations, where each of the dependent variables is also an explanatory variable in the other 
equations, we provide new empirical evidence for all of the UK’s local governments (authorities), 
over the period 2004Q2 to 2013Q3. This approach accounts for any endogeneity, whereby unobserved 
effects are correlated with one other.2 Somewhat unique to the UK is the absence of monetary 
incentives directed at the household to reduce waste or to increase recycling. This allows us to 
undertake a more direct analysis of the trade-off between recyclables collected at the kerbside and 
                                                 
1 D’Amato et al. (2016) state that substitutability/complementarity between waste reduction and recycling 
behaviours depends on the sign of the cross partial involving recycling and waste reduction efforts but do not 
elaborate further. In this paper, we provide a clear link between the theoretical and empirical analysis and use 
the theory to explain the empirical results we obtain.   
2 Kinnaman and Fullerton (2000) were the first to note the importance of controlling for endogeneity within the 
recycling context. 
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those materials collected from recycling centres, such as from civic amenity and bring sites, which we 
define as non-kerbside recycling.3  
 The focus of our study is on understanding the existence, or otherwise, of a trade-off between 
kerbside and non-kerbside provision. If households perceive kerbside to be substitutable for 
non-kerbside, either existing modes may be crowded out, as recycling is diverted away or, the 
expansion of either mode will not make a significant net contribution to the overall level of recycling. 
On the other hand, if households perceive them to be complementary, activities directed at the 
promotion of either kerbside or non-kerbside recycling will translate into a similar increase in the 
overall level of recycling.  
 While recent literature has been able to identify a positive effect arising from the introduction 
and expansion of a kerbside scheme (Ando and Gosslin, 2005; Jenkins et al., 2003), our analysis is 
sophisticated enough to account for the ‘quality’, as well as, the quantity of kerbside provision. Our 
measure of ‘quality’ relates to the type of container offered and its size, as well as the frequency of 
recycling collection. The new dataset that we use has the advantage of providing a full classification 
of recycling schemes of varying characteristics. Woodward et al. (2005) note the importance of 
providing a dedicated container as part of the kerbside scheme but do not elaborate on how 
differences in the characteristics of containers may elicit different responses in terms of recycling 
rates. Abbott et al. (2011) demonstrate that the UK dry recycling rate is sensitive to the method of 
collection, with wheeled storage bins, that provide the greatest opportunities for recycling, improving 
the recycling rate. Moreover, they show that the less frequent the residual waste collection is, the 
more improved will be the rate of recycling. 
 Section 2 outlines the policy background for the UK, section 3 presents our theoretical model 
and its implications, section 4 considers the empirical model and data; section 5 presents the 
estimation results, section 6 provides a further discussion based on the Slutsky analysis, while section 
7 provides concluding remarks. 
                                                 
3 Civic amenity sites are provided by local authorities and are facilities where households typically travel to 
dispose of recyclable materials. They are large-scale facilities and receive a number of materials in potentially 
large volumes. Bring sites are smaller scale facilities which concentrate on the collection of fewer materials e.g. 
paper, glass, clothing. These would be located, for example, in supermarkets or in public car parks. 
4 
 
 
2. Policy background 
A key environmental objective of the UK government is to reduce the amount of residual waste sent 
to landfill and to raise the quantity of recycling. UK waste policy has evolved since the publication of 
the Waste Strategy for England and Wales in 2000 and in response to relevant legislation from the 
European Union, such as the revised Waste Framework Directive (2008) and the Landfill Directive 
(1999/31/EC). The key features of UK household waste policy are presented in Table 1. The waste 
hierarchy, which underpins the UK approach to waste management, adopts waste prevention, reuse 
and recycling, waste recovery and waste disposal in descending order of priority. The only monetary 
incentive applied to household waste is the landfill tax which is payable by local 
authorities/organisations that dispose of the waste. The recycling rewards scheme, adopted by a few 
authorities, rewards households/community organisations with vouchers, which are redeemable in 
local supermarkets. The producer responsibility regulations requires producers to recover and recycle 
a certain proportion of packaging. Complementing these regulations is a voluntary initiative between 
Waste Resources Action Programme (WRAP) and the grocery sector (Courtauld Commitment). The 
rationale underlying these policies is that the recovery and disposal of waste imposes externalities, 
ranging from greenhouse gas emissions arising from landfilling waste to the potential health impacts 
of disposing of hazardous waste. 
< TABLE 1 NEAR HERE > 
Funding for environmental services comes from two revenue streams: i) a block grant given by 
the central government, which funds all services; ii) local taxes levied on households and businesses. 
Since the taxes charged are uncorrelated with waste generation, households and businesses perceive a 
marginal price of zero for every unit of waste disposed beyond the first one (Callan and Thomas, 
2006). At the moment, the landfill tax represents the closest attempt of the UK government to 
introducing market-based instruments in waste management.4 Even so, the landfill tax does not 
                                                 
4 The government has also introduced recycling credits in local authorities where responsibilities for waste 
collection and disposal are separated. The waste disposer pays the credits, equal to savings accrued from 
diverting waste from landfill, to the collectors to encourage recycling collections.  
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incentivise households to control their waste generation. Since the landfill tax is levied on aggregate 
household waste, even if householders make the link between council tax rises and the landfill tax, 
many households are responsible and so the free-rider effect is likely to be present. 
 The outcome of these efforts has been to move the UK from a position where it was recycling 
less than 1% of its household waste in the 1980s to about 45% in 2014 (DEFRA, 2015). Amongst the 
EU(27) it has moved from 10th position in 2007/08 to 7th position in 2013 with its current recycling 
rate just pushing slightly ahead of the EU average (Abbott et al., 2011). 
 Nothwithstanding the major improvement in the UK’s recycling performance, the recycling rate 
is growing at a slower rate (e.g. from 2006 to 2010 the recycling rate increased 2.2% on average, 
compared to an average rise of 3.6% from 2001 to 2005 (EEA, 2013)). In order to secure maximum 
gains from policy initiatives it is important to examine the potential for trade-offs between various 
instruments. These trade-offs should be explicitly considered when proposing a mix of instruments or 
introducing measures incrementally. The complexity of getting the right policy mix is highlighted by 
Turner et al. (1998). 
Figures 1 and 2 illustrate the mix of recycling between kerbside and non-kerbside. The figures 
show the mean dry recycling volumes per 1,000 people, for all of the UK’s local authorities 
(governments) over the period 2004Q2 to 2013Q3.5 In the case of kerbside volumes (Figure 1) the 
average volume is 21.1 tonnes per 1,000 people but the standard deviation is 7.6 tonnes. Greater 
kerbside recycling intensity takes place in the Midlands and southern regions of England, where there 
are also greater recycling rates (Abbott et al., 2011). In the case of non-kerbside volumes, Figure 2 
indicates that greater recycling effort is found in Northern Ireland, Scotland and Wales. Mean 
volumes are 8.7 tonnes per 1,000 people but the standard deviation is 9.9 tonnes. However, although 
useful these figures do not reveal the nature of the relationship between various modes of recycling. 
To do that we present a simple theoretical model which we then attempt to test empirically.  
< FIGURES 1 & 2 NEAR HERE > 
 
                                                 
5 The term dry recyclable materials refers to waste that is free from contaminants such as construction, food or 
garden waste. 
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3. A simple model 
We are interested in how the decision to recycle at the kerb interacts with non-kerbside recycling. 
Deriving inspiration from Beatty et al. (2007) we assume that the individual household obtains its 
utility from recycling its waste through various outlets.6 In addition to the time spent on recycling the 
household can also enjoy leisure. Thus, the household’s utility function is assumed to be: 
),,,( lRRUU nkk       (1) 
where Rk and Rnk denote kerbside and non-kerbside volumes respectively and l denotes leisure. We 
assume  and U is concave in its three arguments. We add the assumption 
that it takes  time to recycle one unit of recyclable waste at the recycling centre/bring site and  time 
to recycle one unit of recyclable waste at the kerbside. Thus, the individual household’s time budget 
can be written as:  
,TRRl knk        (2) 
where T is total non-working time. We assume it takes longer to recycle away from the kerb so that 
>. In addition to interpreting  and  as time coefficients we can also think of them as shadow 
prices (cost of time measured at the hourly wage rate or some proportion thereof) of non-kerbside and 
kerbside recycling respectively. Enhanced kerbside provision increases the convenience of recycling 
and so reduces the amount of time taken to complete it (Viscusi et al., 2012).7 In general, anything 
that affects the time taken to recycle, including government intervention, can affect the value of  and 
 . Alternatively, a more complex recyclable, such as plastic takes more time, because not all plastics 
are recyclable and so the individual has to check its recyclability beforehand. However, for the 
purpose of the theoretical analysis we assume they are constant. 
                                                 
6 As in Beatty et al. (2007) we suppose that there is a first stage optimisation where consumption choice 
generates an amount of waste. The second stage optimisation looks only at the utility derived from different 
modes of waste disposal. In particular, the individual household decides how to recycle via different channels 
assuming that it takes different amounts of time to recycle one unit via each channel. Fullerton and Kinnaman 
(1995) also assume utility is positively related to recycling quantities. 
7 In jurisdictions where there is a deposit-refund scheme, as in Beatty et al. (2007) and Viscusi et al. (2012), we 
can think of (1-s) as the shadow price, where the refund s > 0 is redeemed at the civic amenity site. The 
existence of such a subsidy serves to reduce the shadow price differential between the two modes of recycling. 
However, as previously stated there are no financial incentives in the UK, so that s = 0. 
0;0;0 








l
U
R
U
R
U
nkk
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 From the individual’s utility maximisation problem we will obtain a demand function for 
kerbside and non-kerbside recycling, which we denote by   ,kR  and   ,Rnk  respectively. 
Although both quantities will also be a function of T we have suppressed it, as our primary interest is 
only in   and .  However, throughout we make the reasonable assumption that both kR and nkR  are 
normal, i.e. 0


T
Rk  and .0


T
Rnk   
 As in standard consumer analysis, the signs of 

 nkR  and 

 kR will indicate the gross 
substitute/complement relationship between the two quantities. In particular, if )0( 0 



nkR then 
non-kerbside recycling is a gross substitute for (complement of) kerbside recycling. We can also make 
the analogous statement from the sign of .

 kR  
 In terms of trying to infer the gross substitute/complement relationship between the two 
quantities using our database, we face the problem that shadow prices for kerbside and non-kerbside 
recycling cannot be observed directly. So, we cannot directly infer the signs of 

 kR
and 

 nkR
empirically to determine the gross substitute/complement relationship. However, we can overcome 
this problem by using equivalent conditions for the gross substitute/complement relationship, which 
are derived as follows. Our assumption that both quantities are normal implies that 0



kR
 and 
.0



nkR  So,   ,kR  is invertible w.r.t.   and   ,nkR  is invertible w.r.t. .  We denote these 
inverse functions by ),(
~  kR  and ),(
~
 nkR  respectively.
8 Now, by substituting 
),(~  kR  for  into ),,( nkR  we can derive the following function:   ).,,
~(),(
~
 knkknk RRRR   
                                                 
8 Note that,  .0
1
θ
R
 
R
θ
 and 0
1
γ
R
R
γ nk
nk
k
k




























~~
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Differentiating w.r.t. kR  we get 
1








































knk
k
nk
k
nk RR
R
R
R
R ~
~
. From this, we can deduce 
that 
k
nk
R
R


~
 and 

 nkR
 are of opposite signs. So, we can say that nkR  is a gross substitute 
(complement) for 
kR  if 
)0 (0
k
nk
R
R



~
. 
 Similarly, we can substitute ),(
~
 nkR for   into   ,kR  and obtain the function 
    .,~,,~  nkknkk RRRR   Using a similar reasoning as above, we can say that kR is a gross 
substitute (complement) for 
nkR if ).0 ( 0
nk
k
R
R



~
 Thus, in the empirical section we will try to 
infer the signs of 
nk
k
R
R


~
 and 
k
nk
R
R


~
to determine the gross substitute/complement relationship, which 
in turn may or may not be able to inform us of the substitute/complement relationship.  
 
4. Empirical model and data 
We investigate for all of the UK’s local authorities, over the period 2004Q2 to 2013Q4, whether 
increasing the share of the population with access to kerbside provision improves kerbside recycling 
volumes and if so, is this at the expense of non-kerbside returns.9 Compared to previous contributions 
we consider all the dry recyclable materials collected rather than just focusing on particular types e.g. 
beverage containers, like for example Beatty et al. (2007). All local authorities undertake separate 
collections for residual waste and dry recycling materials. Recycled materials come in two forms: i) 
dry recycling materials (e.g. bottles, paper, card) are those waste streams that are free from 
contaminants, such as food, garden waste or construction materials; ii) green recycling materials, 
which consist of household food waste and garden waste (e.g. grass cuttings). 
                                                 
9
Since recycling levels at the scale of the local authority are outcomes of individual decisions, it appears 
reasonable to assume a representative household and to infer that relationships that hold at the level of the 
household also hold in the aggregate on average. 
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 Given households face a choice in how to deal with their waste, there potentially could be a 
trade-off between kerbside recycling and non-kerbside recycling volumes. For completeness we 
include estimation of residual waste parameters as well. We therefore follow the approach of 
estimating a system of three equations, where each has explanatory variables that are dependent 
variables from the other two waste stream equations in the system. To estimate our system we use the 
Three Stage Least Squares (3SLS) estimation methodology. This allows for the joint estimation of an 
entire system of equations, when some of the equations contain endogenous variables, which are 
usually dependent variables of other variables in the system (Zellner and Theil, 1962; Davidson and 
Mackinnon, 1993; Greene, 2012).10 Dry kerbside recycling volumes, volumes of dry materials 
deposited at a recycling centre and residual waste are therefore determined as follows: 
,Xfrmtdrvrvwv
Xcaswvrvrv
Xnmtfrmtdwvrvrv
wv
itjit
5
1j
j5
wv
jit
7
1j
j4
wv
jit
7
1j
j3
dnk
it2
dk
it10it
dnk
itjit
5
1j
j4it3it2
dk
it10
dnk
it
dk
itjit
5
1j
j6it5
dk
jit
9
1j
j4
dk
jit
9
1j
j3it2
dnk
it10
dk
it












 (3)
 
where 
dk
itrv  is the log volume of dry recycling materials collected at the kerbside, 
dnk
itrv  is the log 
volume of dry recycling materials deposited at recycling centres (both civic amenity and bring sites) 
and  is the log volume of residual waste collected from households. In each equation, the 
dependent variable is explained by factors directly related to the waste stream, such as aspects of 
service provision. For example, in the case of kerbside recycling and residual waste collection these 
consist of methods of collection and frequency of collection. Additionally in the case of kerbside, the 
                                                 
10 3SLS uses an instrumental variable approach that produces consistent estimates, which control for the 
cross-correlation in the error terms across equations, whilst also avoiding any estimation bias coming from OLS 
when the disturbances and endogenous explanatory variables are correlated. 3SLS estimates are also expected to 
be more efficient than estimates from Two Stage Least Squares (2SLS) when the estimated residuals are 
normally distributed. 3SLS estimates have the same asymptotic distribution as Full Information Maximum 
Likelihood (FIML) estimates, though if the error term is correlated with at least one independent variable, the 
3SLS will be biased in small samples. 
 
itwv
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number of materials collected is relevant whereas, in the case of non-kerbside, aspects of collection 
are not relevant but number of recycling centres are. In addition to these direct effects, there are also 
indirect effects arising from alternative modes of recycling and disposal. 
In the first equation, the methods of dry recycling collection are given by 
dk
jitmtd , which denotes 
the percentage of the population with access to the jth method of dry recycling collection in local 
authority i at time period t. There are nine methods of collection categorised, which vary according to 
the size of the container used for collection, therefore providing varying amounts of recycling 
capacity (see Appendix: Data and Sources). For each method of collection, there is a frequency of dry 
recycling collection 
dk
jitfr , which denotes the j
th frequency of collection offered by local authority i at 
period t. The frequency of dry collection is categorised as being either more frequent than weekly, 
weekly, fortnightly or less frequent than fortnightly. We use a scale where increasing values imply 
lower frequencies of collection. The number of materials collected at the kerbside is denoted by 
,itnmt while jitX  refers to a series of control variables that could explain the variation in recycling 
performance through the size of the local authority and its composition. These are consistent with the 
variables commonly used in the literature, namely the log of population; the log of the local 
authority’s land area; the log of population density; the log of the local authority’s index of 
deprivation; and the log of urban population. A more urbanised population tends to be associated with 
greater provision of kerbside recycling (Viscusi et al., 2012). Higher population densities capture a 
higher prevalence of multi-dwelling occupancy, which tends to imply lower kerbside recycling yields 
(Abbott et al., 2013). Lower kerbside yields have also been associated with higher levels of 
deprivation (WRAP, 2010b). 
In the second equation itcas  refers to the number of recycling centres where materials can be 
deposited. For the determinants of residual waste, all independent variables are as previously defined, 
except for 
wv
jitmtd  and 
wv
jitfr , which are methods of residual waste collection and their frequencies. 
There are seven methods of residual waste collection and 
wv
jitmtd  denotes the proportion of the 
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population with access to the jth method of residual waste collection offered by local authority i at 
period t. 
Taking the first two equations in (3) we empirically model the relationship between kerbside 
and non-kerbside recycling through their quantities. Using the equivalent conditions we derived in the 
previous section, we can deduce the gross complement/substitution relationship from the signs of 1
and 1 which capture 
nk
k
R
R


~
 and 
k
nk
R
R


~
respectively. In particular, if β1<0 then non-kerbside is a gross 
substitute for kerbside. However if β1>0 then we can say that non-kerbside is a gross complement of 
kerbside. We can also make an analogous inference about whether kerbside is a gross substitute or 
complement for non-kerbside from the sign of α1. 
We would expect that increasing the size of the container, frequency of collection and number 
of materials would reduce the shadow price of kerbside, which in turn increases kerbside volumes. 
Similarly, we would expect that increasing the number of civic amenity sites would reduce the 
shadow price of non-kerbside resulting in an increase in its volume.11  
 We also produce separate estimates for green recycling, hitherto not considered by the 
literature, which have a different set of determinants. We estimate the following system: 
wv
itjit
5
1j
j5
wv
it
7
1j
j4
wv
jit
7
1j
j3
gnk
it2
gk
it10it
gnk
itjit
5
1j
j4it3it2
gk
it10
gnk
it
gk
itjit
5
1j
j5
gk
it
4
1j
j4
gk
jit
4
1j
j3it2
gnk
it10
gk
it
Xfrmtdrvrvwv
Xcaswvrvrv
Xfrmtdwvrvrv












  (4)
 
where 
gk
itrv  is the volume of green waste that is recycled at the kerbside, 
gnk
itrv denotes the green 
waste recycled at civic amenity sites, and  again is the volume of residual waste collected from 
                                                 
11 We do not use these variables to infer the cross derivatives 


k
R
 and 


nk
R
, as to do so would require 
introducing adhoc assumptions, since we do not know the full set of variables and the ways in which they 
determine prices, nor whether some variables affect both prices.    
itwv
12 
 
households. The four methods of green recycling collection are denoted by
gk
jitmtd , showing the 
proportion of the local authority’s population with access to green recycling collection method j in 
local authority i at time period t. The respective frequencies of collection are given by 
gk
jitfr . All other 
variables included are the same as those in the dry recycling system. The coefficients follow similar 
interpretations to those included in the dry recycling system of equations (3). Specifically, following 
on from the previous analysis 
1  captures 
k
nk
R
R


~
so that if φ1 < 0, we can deduce that non-kerbside 
green waste is a gross substitute for kerbside green waste collections.12 If φ1 > 0, non-kerbside is a 
gross complement of kerbside.  
The recycling and residual waste data, as well as the determinants, come from the online portal 
http://www.wastedataflow.org/ to which local authorities submit recycling and waste data. One of the 
main advantages of using this source is that the series are reported consistently in response to a 
questionnaire completed by all UK local authorities. We utilize separate series for recycling at the 
kerbside and non-kerbside, where the latter is defined as the sum of recycling at civic amenity and 
bring sites. The socio-economic series for the control variables comes from the Office of National 
Statistics. Data from these two sources were combined to produce a comprehensive database on local 
authorities.13 We utilise data for all of the UK’s local authorities over the period 2004Q2 to 2013Q3, 
the longest time period for which data is available. A full list of the variables used for estimation and 
their data sources are provided in the Appendix.  
 
5. Estimation results 
The 3SLS estimation results of our system of equations in (3) are shown in Table 2. The research 
question we seek to address is whether there is trade-off between the two modes of recycling when 
there is change in the provision of one of them. We have shown in section 4 that to answer this 
                                                 
12 In the green context Rnk refers to green waste that is recycled at the civic amenity site and  is the shadow 
price of recycling green waste at the kerb.  
13 This dataset which formed one of the outputs from ESRC project ‘Examining variation in recycling across 
UK’ (RES-000-22-3738) is available from the UK ESDS archive. 
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question we can examine the sign of the derivative 
k
nk
R
R


~
. From Panel (B) the variable 
dk
itrv is 
statistically insignificant.14 So, even if improved kerbside recycling provision raises kerbside 
recycling volumes, this is not at the expense of returns to recycling centres. 
 Our analysis also allows us to examine whether expanding the role of non-kerbside recycling 
facilities affects kerbside provision. We can see in Panel (A) that the statistically significant 
dnk
itrv
variable with a negatively signed estimated coefficient implies that as recycling volumes collected 
from recycling centres increase, volumes recovered at the kerbside are reduced. 
 We also include the results for methods, frequencies and number of materials collected at the 
kerbside. In general, the results conform to expectations. As these aspects of recycling collections 
improve, the shadow price of kerbside collections falls to reflect this and the consequences of this is 
that kerbside volumes increase. In the case of non-kerbside volumes, increasing the number of 
recycling centres has a positive effect through reducing the cost of recycling via this channel. In both 
of the estimated equations, the results of the itwv variable indicate that greater volumes of residual 
waste will lower both kerbside and non-kerbside recycling volumes, albeit with a smaller marginal 
effect for non-kerbside than for kerbside recycling. In the residual waste equation, we see that 
increasing kerbside reduces residual waste while increasing non-kerbside does not. 15 This result can 
probably be explained by the fact that kerbside recycling materials are collected from households just 
as residual waste is and so has a more direct effect residual waste. The level of the population is also 
positively related to non-kerbside volumes. 
 The estimation results for the control variables conform to expectations and are consistent 
across both panels. More urbanised populations lead to greater recycling volumes at the kerb. 
However, larger and more densely populated areas work in the opposite direction. It may be that the 
larger the area, the lower the opportunities for recycling as recycling provision may be low or absent. 
                                                 
14 Albeit that the coefficient 1 , which represents 
k
nk
R
R


~
, is positive. 
15 We are grateful to an anonymous referee for highlighting this beneficial effect of kerbside recycling.  
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However, without knowing more about the specific characteristics of a particular area, it is difficult to 
draw firm conclusions from this. Deprivation is not significant in the kerbside recycling equation. 
However, deprivation is largely determined by social grade, which relates to occupation, and in turn is 
highly correlated to income and this has been found to be ambiguously related to recycling behaviour 
(Abbott et al., 2011; Viscusi et al., 2012).16 
 Bringing our theoretical and empirical results together we can conclude that decreasing 
(increasing) the shadow price of kerbside does not decrease (increase) non-kerbside recycling. On the 
other hand, decreasing (increasing) the shadow price of non-kerbside recycling does decrease 
(increase) kerbside recycling. Thus, we can infer that kerbside recycling is a gross substitute for 
non-kerbside recycling but not the other way around. Although at first glance this appears odd, we 
know from standard analysis that this is possible because the gross substitute/complement relationship 
between two quantities does not have to be symmetric.  
< TABLE 2 NEAR HERE > 
 Table 3 presents the results from estimating the system of equations in (4) that explain the 
recycling of green waste volumes and residual waste. Looking at panel (A) and panel (B) together we 
see that the coefficients for the collection of non-kerbside green waste (
gnk
itrv ) and green waste 
collected at the kerbside ( gk
itrv ) are both negatively signed and statistically significant. Thus, unlike in 
the case of dry recycling, these two modes of green waste recycling are gross substitutes for each 
other. In particular, as the provision of kerbside green waste collections improves we can expect to 
see a reduction in non-kerbside returns.  
< TABLE 3 NEAR HERE > 
The frequency of collection appears to be less important for green waste than for dry materials. 
Only the index of deprivation and the size of the urban population are found to be statistically 
significant amongst the control variables. More deprived local authorities produce lower green 
recycling volumes, a result which might be explained by the fact that deprived areas tend to be more 
                                                 
16 Alternatively, higher incomes can be associated with higher opportunity costs of time and hence lower 
recycling. Higher incomes imply greater demand for environmental quality and so more recycling.  
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urbanised and they are likely to have smaller green space. The overall fit of the 3SLS equations 
appears to be lower for the green waste recycling equation than when explaining dry recycling 
materials, with an R2 of -0.077 even found for the non-kerbside green recycling equation. This latter 
measure of goodness of fit implies our equation predicts the volume of green recycling materials from 
recycling centres worse than a constant only model (STATA, 2015). From the residual waste equation 
in panel (C) we can see that the more waste that is recycled at the kerb rather than at the recycling 
centre, the greater the diversion of waste from landfill. 
 
6. Further discussion  
So far we have only considered the gross relationship between kerbside and non-kerbside. However, 
we could also consider the substitute/complement relationship using the Slutsky analysis adapted to 
our particular context, which is conceptually more sound than the gross relationship.17 Of course it is 
well known that because of issues of unobservability it is not possible to make direct inference of the 
substitute/complement relationship from empirical analysis. However, it may be possible to make 
indirect inference about this relationship by using the empirical results about the gross relationship. 
Therefore, we will briefly consider the Slutsky equations for our context to see if we can deduce the 
substitute/complement relationship between kerbside and non-kerbside based on our empirical 
findings of the gross relationship.  
 The Slutsky equations for our model given in section 4 are:  
(6)                                                     ,                                        
                                                                                                                                               
(5)                                                                                           
nk
kk
h
k
k
nknk
h
nk
R
T
RRR
R
T
RRR


















 
                                                 
17 In distinguishing the substitute/complement relationship from the gross substitute/complement relationship we 
are following terminology as in Mas-Colell et al. (1995).  
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where 


h
nkR and 


h
kR
denote the Hicksian substitution effects, whose signs will determine the 
substitute/complement relationship.18 It may be mentioned that, unlike the gross relationship, the 
substitute/complement relationship is symmetric so it is sufficient to look at only one of the two 
Hicksian substitution effects. Therefore without loss of generality, we will look at the sign of 


h
nkR  
for the relationship between kerbside and non-kerbside recycling.  
 For completeness, we will first derive a fairly intuitive condition for the substitute/complement 
relationship from a theoretical perspective. Substituting (2) into (1) in the individual’s utility 
maximisation problem given in section 4, we can define a function19 
).,,(),,( knknkknkk RRTRRUTRRV      (7) 
Denoting the second derivative of V w.r.t. k and nk as knkV we get:  
                                  llnklklknkknk UUUUV       (8) 
We show in a supplementary appendix (available from the authors upon request) that whether 
h
nkR


≷ 0 depends on whether knkV ≶ 0. For example, 0knkV  implies that ,0



h
nkR  that is kerbside 
and non-kerbside recycling are complements of each other, which intuitively makes sense as their 
marginal utilities move together. On the other hand, 0knkV  implies that ,0



h
nkR that is the two 
modes of recycling are substitutes for each other.  
 Using the inference we have drawn about the gross relationships from our estimation results 
and the Slutsky equations we will now examine whether we can make any indirect inference from our 
dataset about the substitute/complement relationship. Let us first look at the case of dry recycling. 
There we could not say that non-kerbside was a gross substitute for kerbside. This finding together 
                                                 
18 
k
nk R
T
R

  and 
nk
k R
T
R

 denote the income effects.  
19 Since we assume concavity of U it also follows that V is concave in Rk and Rnk for any T.  
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with (5) does not allow us to say whether the two modes of recycling are substitutes or complements 
of each other.20 On the other hand, we also found that kerbside was a gross substitute for non-
kerbside, which together with (6) allow us to infer that the two modes of recycling are substitutes for 
each other.21 
 In the case of green recycling, we found that kerbside and non-kerbside were gross substitutes 
for each other. So by using either (5) or (6) we can infer that both Hicksian substitution effects are 
positive. Thus, either of the two inferences drawn regarding the gross relationship yields the same 
conclusion, namely, the two modes of green recycling are substitutes for each other.  
 It is interesting to note the contrast between the dry recycling and green recycling. In the case 
of dry recycling, the empirical findings alone suggest no trade-off when considering a change in the 
shadow price of kerbside, but a trade-off when considering a change in the shadow price of non-
kerbside. However, combining the empirical findings with the theory suggests that there is a trade-off 
irrespective of whether we consider a change in either shadow price. In the case of green recycling 
whether we consider the empirical findings on their own or in combination with theory, we obtain the 
unambiguous conclusion that there is a trade-off. 
 
7. Conclusion 
A primary environmental objective of most governments is to grow the amount of household waste 
that is recycled rather than sent to landfill or incineration. In achieving this goal, each government 
needs to choose how it wants to collect waste in order to maximize the recycling rate. It has been 
common to rely on kerbside recycling collections, given that they are expected to make the process of 
recycling waste more convenient, therefore reducing the amount of leisure activity devoted to the 
activity. But kerbside recycling could partially displace recycling made away from the kerb at 
recycling centres. Our theoretical model has shown that policymakers need to reflect on whether their 
                                                 
20 When 

 nkR is negative, equation (5) does not allow us to infer the sign of .


h
nkR  
21 When 

 kR is positive, equation (6) allows us to infer that 


h
kR is positive.  
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chosen approach to waste recycling collection affects the values of θ and γ, the coefficients which 
measure the time incurred in non-kerbside and kerbside recycling. If there is no discernible impact on 
the time coefficients, then policymakers need not worry about the potential for trade-off between the 
two modes of recycling. However, if a government intervention affects the time taken to perform an 
activity the obvious question to ask is whether the level of that activity is affected. Our analysis points 
out that it is also important to assess how the levels of associated activities are affected, as this will 
also enhance or detract from the effectiveness of the initial intervention on the overall policy objective 
of increasing recycling volumes. 
 We focus on the potential trade-off between kerbside recycling volumes and non-kerbside 
volumes, for the UK’s local authorities from 2004Q2 to 2013Q3 but the message of our analysis has 
broader applications. In general, policymakers should consider interactions between the activity 
targeted by the intervention and other related activities to assess the net benefits in achieving the 
objective. In our particular study, we distinguished between dry and green recycling and looked at the 
trade-off between kerbside and non-kerbside recycling in each case as a result of a change in the 
provision of kerbside or non-kerbside facilities. Our empirical findings for dry recycling suggested no 
trade-off between the two modes of recycling for a change in the provision of kerbside provision but 
the existence of a trade-off for a change in non-kerbside provision. For green recycling, our empirical 
findings suggested an unambiguous trade-off irrespective of the change in provision we consider.  
 We were also interested in exploring whether it was possible to draw inferences about the more 
conceptually sound notion of a substitute/complement relationship, as opposed to the gross 
relationship. However, as this could not be done directly by looking at the empirical findings we had 
to use a line of reasoning that brought together the empirical findings with Slutsky analysis applied to 
our context. In doing so, we could infer that kerbside and non-kerbside recycling were substitutes for 
one another, both for dry and green recycling. In other words, there is a trade-off between the two 
modes of recycling (both dry and green), irrespective of the change in provision considered. Thus, our 
study shows that it is possible to arrive at different conclusions about the trade-off, depending on 
whether we rely only on the empirical findings or combine it with theory. This has implications for 
policy interventions. In particular, in the case of dry recycling, if one relies on the empirical findings 
19 
 
alone, then possible trade-offs is not a cause for concern when considering interventions to kerbside 
provision, but is a cause for concern when considering interventions to non-kerbside provision. 
However, if one relies on the empirical findings along with the theory, then possible trade-offs are not 
a cause for concern whether we consider interventions to either mode of recycling provision. 
Fortunately, in the case of green recycling, the distinction between relying only on empirical findings 
or combining them with theory does not arise, since in both cases possible trade-offs is a cause for 
concern.  
 Compared to previous studies, (Beatty et al., 2007; D’Amato et al., 2016; Jenkins et al., 2003; 
Sidique et al., 2010a,b; Viscusi et al., 2012) we find evidence of a negative interaction between 
different modes of recycling. We go further by making the distinction between whether services are 
substitutes/complements or gross substitutes/complements and show that this might matter for policy 
interventions. 
 Thus, our analysis has indicated a trade-off between kerbside and non-kerbside for both dry and 
green recycling when the empirical and theoretical analyses are considered together. This would 
appear to be a drawback of promoting kerbside recycling as the impact on overall recycling volumes 
could be diminished by the negative effect on non-kerbside recycling. However, our results also 
indicate that increasing kerbside recycling for both dry and green recycling can reduce residual waste, 
whereas an increase in non-kerbside does not. This is noteworthy in the light of the waste hierarchy, 
which plays a fundamental role in UK waste policy where the first priority is waste prevention.  
 Further research could consider whether this result holds across the various materials that 
constitute our measure of dry recycling materials e.g. separate estimates for glass versus plastics. 
Moreover, given the variation in recycling performance across the UK, shown in Figures 1 and 2, a 
comprehensive regional analysis could identify whether our results hold across the regions and if 
trade-offs exist in some areas, allowing recycling practice to be focused more clearly to maximise 
recycling objectives. 
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Appendix: Data and Sources 
 
Variable Definition 
  
Dependent variables 
 
 Log of tonnes of dry recycled materials collected through kerbside collection 
schemes 
 Log of tonnes of dry recycled materials collected through deposits to either civic 
amenity sites or bring sites 
 Log of tonnes of green recycled materials collected through kerbside collection 
schemes 
 Log of tonnes of green recycled materials collected through deposits to either 
civic amenity sites or bring sites 
 
 
Log of tonnes of residual waste collected through kerbside collection 
Methods of dry recycling waste collection 
 
dk
it1mtd  
Proportion of the population with access to ‘Kerbside box<35 litres’ method 
dk
it2mtd  
Proportion of the population with access to ‘Kerbside box 35-50 litres’ method 
dk
it3mtd  
Proportion of the population with access to ‘Kerbside box>50 litres’ method 
dk
it4mtd  
Proportion of the population with access to ‘Reusable sacks’ method 
dk
it5mtd  
Proportion of the population with access to ‘Non-reusable sacks’ method 
dk
it6mtd  
Proportion of the population with access to ‘Wheeled bin<120 litres’ method 
dk
it7mtd  
Proportion of the population with access to ‘Wheeled bin 120-180 litres’ method 
dk
it8mtd  
Proportion of the population with access to ‘Wheeled bin 181-240 litres’ method 
dk
it9mtd  
Proportion of the population with access to ‘Wheeled bin>241 litres’ method 
 
Frequencies of dry recycling waste collection 
 
dk
it1fr  
Collection frequency for ‘Kerbside box<35 litres’ method 
dk
it2fr  
Collection frequency for ‘Kerbside box 35-50 litres’ method 
dk
it3fr  
Collection frequency for ‘Kerbside box>50 litres’ method 
dk
it4fr  
Collection frequency for ‘Reusable sacks’ method 
dk
it5fr  
Collection frequency for ‘Non-reusable sacks’ method 
dk
it6fr  
Collection frequency for ‘Wheeled bin<120 litres’ method 
dk
it7fr  
Collection frequency for ‘Wheeled bin 120-180 litres’ method 
dk
it8fr  
Collection frequency for ‘Wheeled bin 181-240 litres’ method 
dk
it9fr  
Collection frequency for ‘Wheeled bin>241 litres’ method 
 
Methods of green recycling waste collection 
 
gk
it1mtd  
Proportion of the population with access to ‘Reusable sacks’ method 
dk
itrv
dnk
itrv
gk
itrv
gnk
itrv
itwv
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gk
it2mtd  
Proportion of the population with access to ‘Wheeled bin <120 litres’ method 
gk
it3mtd  
Proportion of the population with access to ‘Wheeled bin 120-180 litres’ method 
gk
it4mtd  
Proportion of the population with access to ‘Wheeled bin 241+ litres’ method 
 
Frequencies of green recycling collection 
 
gk
it1fr  
Collection frequency for ‘Reusable sacks’ method 
gk
it2fr  
Collection frequency for ‘Wheeled bin <120 litres’ method 
gk
it3fr  
Collection frequency for ‘Wheeled bin 120-180 litres’ method 
gk
it4fr  
Collection frequency for ‘Wheeled bin 241+ litres’ method 
 
Methods of residual waste collection 
 
wv
it1mtd  
Proportion of the population with access to ‘Wheeled Bin 100-150 litres’ method 
wv
it2mtd  
Proportion of the population with access to ‘Wheeled Bin 151-200 litres’ method 
wv
it3mtd  
Proportion of the population with access to ‘Wheeled Bin 251-300 litres’ method 
wv
it4mtd  
Proportion of the population with access to ‘Wheeled Bin>350 litres’ method 
wv
it5mtd  
Proportion of the population with access to ‘Plastic sacks’ method 
wv
it6mtd  
Proportion of the population with access to ‘Household refuse bins’ method 
wv
it7mtd  
Proportion of the population with access to ‘Communal bins’ method 
 
Frequencies of residual waste collection 
 
wv
it1fr  
Collection frequency for ‘Wheeled Bin 100-150 litres’ method 
wv
it2fr  
Collection frequency for ‘Wheeled Bin 151-200 litres’ method 
wv
it3fr  
Collection frequency for ‘Wheeled Bin 251-300 litres’ method 
wv
it4fr  
Collection frequency for ‘Wheeled Bin>350 litres’ method 
wv
it5fr  
Collection frequency for ‘Plastic sacks’ method 
wv
it6fr  
Collection frequency for ‘Household refuse bins’ method 
wv
it7fr  
Collection frequency for ‘Communal bins’ method 
 
Additional recycling determinants 
 
 Number of dry recycling materials collected at kerbside 
 Log of number of civic amenity sites in the local authority 
 
Control variables 
 
it1X  
log of the local authority population 
it2X  
log of the local authority’s area in hectares 
itnmt
itcas
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it3X  
log of population density 
it4X  
log of the local authority’s index of deprivation 
it5X  
log of urban population 
Notes: the source for the control variables is http://www.ons.gov.uk, while all other series come from http://www.wastedataflow.org/ 
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Figure 1: Kerbside dry recycling volumes per 1,000 people (all 
materials), average values 2004Q2 to 2013Q3.  
 
Notes: Produced using the spmap command of STATA with data taken from 
http://www.wastedataflow.org.  
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Figure 2: Non-kerbside dry recycling volumes per 1,000 people (all materials), average values 
2004Q2 to 2013Q3.  
 
 
Notes: Produced using the spmap command of STATA with data taken from 
http://www.wastedataflow.org.  
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Table 1: A summary of UK Household Waste Policy 
 
Waste hierarchy  
50% household waste recycling target for the UK   
70% by 2025 for Scotland and Wales,  
60% by 2020 for Northern Ireland  
Individual targets set by English local authorities.  
 
£80/tonne landfill tax  
 
Recycling rewards schemes  
 
Producer Responsibility (Packaging Waste) Regulations 2007 (amended in 2016) 
5p charge for single use bags distributed by large retailers. 
Courtauld Commitment 2025  
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
31 
 
Table 2: Determinants of the quantity recycled (dry materials) and residual waste 
 
.      
(A) 
Kerbside recycling 
 
Variable Estimated 
coefficient 
 
z-statistic Variable Estimated 
coefficient 
z-statistic 
      
 -0.105 -2.67
* dk
it4mtd  
0.0007 2.75* 
 -1.878 -16.38
* dk
it4fr  
-0.016 -2.00* 
it1X  
11.520 7.22* dk
it5mtd  
0.0001 0.73 
it2X  
-8.608 -5.61* dk
it5fr  
-0.005 -1.10 
it3X  
-8.695 -5.65* dk
it6mtd  
0.001 0.25 
it4X  
-0.030 -1.80 dk
it6fr  
-0.012 -1.00 
it5X  
0.006 10.35* dk
it7mtd  
0.001 4.16* 
dk
it1mtd  
0.001 2.00* dk
it7fr  
-0.012 -2.34* 
dk
it1fr  
-0.006 -0.44 dk
it8mtd  
0.001 4.27* 
dk
it2mtd  
0.0004 1.10 dk
it8fr  
0.0007 0.14 
dk
it2fr  
-0.012 -1.13 dk
it9mtd  
-0.0007 -1.27 
dk
it3mtd  
0.0005 2.03* dk
it9fr  
0.022 4.58* 
dk
it3fr  
-0.019 -2.44*  0.017 2.86
* 
      
R2 = 0.638 
      
.      
(B) 
Non-kerbside recycling 
 
Variable Estimated 
coefficient 
 
z-statistic Variable Estimated 
coefficient 
z-statistic 
 0.063 0.90 
it2X  
-8.408 -3.64* 
 -0.382 -2.38
* 
it3X  
-8.615 -3.72* 
 0.187 7.13
* 
it4X  
-0.059 -2.23* 
it1X  
9.691 4.08* 
it5X  
0.005 5.64* 
      
R2 = 0.411 
 
      
(C) 
Residual waste 
 
Variable Estimated 
coefficient 
 
z-statistic Variable Estimated 
coefficient 
z-statistic 
 -0.383 -27.00
* wv
it3mtd  
0.0004 2.14* 
dnk
itrv
itwv
itnmt
dk
itrv
itwv
itcas
dk
itrv
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 -0.019 -1.34 
wv
it3fr  
0.003 0.77 
it1X  
5.224 7.94* wv
it4mtd  
0.0008 1.20 
it2X  
-3.854 -5.88* wv
it4fr  
0.008 2.45* 
it3X  
-3.888 -5.92* wv
it5mtd  
-0.00003 -0.27 
it4X  
0.006 0.79 wv
it5fr  
0.004 1.62 
it5X  
0.002 8.45* wv
it6mtd  
0.0005 2.01* 
wv
it1mtd  
0.0005 3.97* wv
it6fr  
0.004 0.89 
wv
it1fr  
-0.011 -4.28* wv
it7mtd  
0.0003 1.55 
wv
it2mtd  
0.0005 5.92* wv
it7fr  
0.006 2.38* 
wv
it2fr  
-0.003 -1.02    
      
R2 = 0.898 
      
Note: 3SLS estimates. Constants not reported to conserve space. * indicates significance at the 5% level. Number of observations is 3,497. 
  
dnk
itrv
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Table 3: Determinants of the quantity recycled (composting materials) and residual waste 
 
      
(A) 
Kerbside recycling 
 
Variable Estimated 
coefficient 
 
z-statistic Variable Estimated 
coefficient 
z-statistic 
      
gnk
itrv  
 
-0.593 -9.03* gk
it1mtd  
0.005 5.05* 
 -1.202 -2.51
* gk
it1fr  
0.010 0.39 
it1X  
3.371 0.59 gk
it2mtd  
0.240 1.95 
it2X  
-0.585 -0.10 gk
it2fr  
-0.530 -4.76* 
it3X  
-0.887 -0.16 gk
it3mtd  
0.012 7.62* 
it4X  
-0.354 -4.78* gk
it3fr  
0.041 1.43 
it5X  
0.007 2.78* gk
it4mtd  
0.013 10.41* 
   gk
it4fr  
-0.004 -0.14 
R2 = 0.086 
      
      
(B) 
Non-kerbside recycling 
 
Variable Estimated  
coefficient 
z-statistic Variable Estimated 
coefficient 
z-statistic 
      
 -1.742 -4.50
* 
it2X  
-1.010 -0.17 
 -0.412 -9.03
* 
it3X  
-1.301 -0.22 
 0.183 3.48
* 
it4X  
-0.504 -7.21* 
it1X  
3.970 0.67 
it5X  
0.008 3.22* 
      
      
R2 = -0.077 
 
      
(C) 
Residual waste 
 
Variable Estimated 
coefficient 
 
z-statistic Variable Estimated 
coefficient 
z-statistic 
 -0.060 -5.36
* wv
it3mtd  
0.001 2.21* 
 -0.032 -1.35 
wv
it3fr  
-0.018 -1.81* 
it1X  
0.939 0.91 wv
it4mtd  
0.002 1.93 
it2X  
0.200 0.19 wv
it4fr  
-0.010 -1.59 
itwv
itwv
gk
itrv
itcas
gk
itrv
gnk
itrv
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it3X  
0.150 0.15 wv
it5mtd  
0.0001  0.33 
it4X  
0.008 0.46 wv
it5fr  
0.006 0.73 
it5X  
0.002 5.27* wv
it6mtd  
0.0004 0.67 
wv
it1mtd  
0.002 4.39* wv
it6fr  
0.012 1.13 
wv
it1fr  
-0.027 -5.38* wv
it7mtd  
0.025 2.90* 
wv
it2mtd  
0.003 9.79* wv
it7fr  
0.020 3.06* 
wv
it2fr  
-0.051 -6.11*    
      
R2 = 0.920 
      
Note: 3SLS estimates. Constants not reported to conserve space. * indicates significance at the 5% level. Number of observations is 3,497. 
 
 
 
 
